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1 Where Logical Semantics (Might Have) Went Wrong
In the concluding remarks of Ontological Promiscuity Hobbs (1985) made what
we believe to be a very insightful observation: given that semantics is an attempt
at specifying the relation between language and the world, if “one can assume
a theory of the world that is isomorphic to the way we talk about it ... then
semantics becomes nearly trivial”. But how exactly can we rectify our logical
formalisms so that semantics, an endeavor that has occupied the most penetrat-
ing minds for over two centuries, can become (nearly) trivial, and what exactly
does it mean to assume a theory of the world in our semantics?
In this paper we hope to provide answers for both questions. First, we believe
that a commonsense theory of the world can (and should) be embedded in our
semantic formalisms resulting in a logical semantics grounded in commonsense
metaphysics. Moreover, we believe the first step to accomplishing this vision is
rectifying what we think was a crucial oversight in logical semantics, namely the
failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different types of concepts: (i)
ontological concepts, that correspond to what Cocchiarella (2001) calls first-
intension concepts and are types in a strongly-typed ontology; and (ii) logical
concepts (or second intension concepts), that are predicates corresponding to
properties of (and relations between) objects of various ontological types1.
In such a framework, which we will refer to henceforth by ontologik, it
will be shown how type unification and other type operations can be used to
account for the ‘missing text phenomenon’ (MTP) (see Saba, 2019a) that is at
the heart of most challenges in the semantics of natural language, by uncovering
the significant amount of missing text that is never explicitly stated in everyday
discourse, but is often implicitly assumed as shared background knowledge.
2 The ‘Missing Text Phenomenon’ (MTP)
To breifly describe the motivation behind our work, let us consider a simple
example that illustrates the relationship between MTP and the need for distin-
guishing between ontological and logical concepts. Consider the sentences in (1)
and (2) and their translation into first-order predicate logic (FOPL).
1 Our ontological types are similar to the types in Sommers’ (1963) Tree of Language
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(1) Julie is an articulate person
⇒ articulate(Julie) ∧ person(Julie)
(2) Julie is articulate
⇒ articulate(Julie)
Note that (1) and (2) have different translations into first-order predicate logic,
although the two sentences seem to have the same semantic and cognitive con-
tent. For the translation of (1) and (2) into FOPL to be the same, person(Julie)
in (1) must be assumed to be true, a priori since (a ∧ b = a) ⊃ b. This in fact
is quite sensible, since articulate(Julie) is meaningful only if Julie is a person.
What all of this means is that the proper translation of (1) and (2) should treat
person as a type, and articulate as a property that is predicable (makes sense
to say) of objects that are of type person:
(3) (∃1Julie :: person)(articulate(Julie))
What (3) says is that there is a unique object named Julie, such that the property
articulate is true of Julie. The point of this simple example was to illustrate
that person in (2) was implicit, and was assumed by the speaker to be ‘recov-
erable’ given our commonsense knowledge of the world. Embedding ontological
types in our semantics thus allows us to uncover all the missing text and, in the
process, resolve some of the most challenging problems in the semantics of nat-
ural language. Consider (4) and its translation into a logical form in ontologik.
(4) The loud omelet wants another beer
⇒ (∃o :: omelet)(∃b :: beer)
(loud(o :: person) ∧ want(o :: animal, b :: entity))
That is, there is some o, which is an object of type omelet, and some b, which
is an object of type beer, and such that o is loud, and thus be must (in this
context) an object of type person, and where o wants b, and where in this con-
text o must be an object of type animal and where b could be any entity.
What we have now are objects that, in the same scope, are associated with dif-
ferent types. The type unification (beer • entity) is quite simple, since beer
IsA entity. However, consider now the type unification concerning o that allows
us to ‘ucover’ the missing text, namley that [some loud person eating] the
omelet wants a beer :
(omelet • (animal • person)) → (omelet • person)
→ (person eating omelet)
3 What Adjective-Ordering Restrictions Mystery?
The phenomenon of adjective-ordering re-strictions (AORs) concerns the appar-
ent adjective ordering we tend to prefer when multiple adjectives are used in
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a sequence. The AOR phenomenon, which has been a longstanding subject of
debate in linguistics (see Cinque 1994; and Vendler, 1968), can be illsutrated by
the example in (5), where the first sentence is usually preferred.
(5) Jon bought a beautiful red car
#Jon bought a red beautiful car
Far from being a ‘mystery’, however, it turns out that the rules of type-casting
are behind our decision of a preferred reading. Assuming beautiful(x :: entity)
and red(x :: physical) - i.e., that beautiful is predicable of any entity and
that red is predicable of objects that must be of type physical, then the type
unification (entity • (physical • car)) will succeed while (physical • (entity
• car)) is technically not allowed: we can always cast-up (generalize), casting
down (from entity to physical, in this case), is however undecidable.
4 What Paradox of the Ravens?
Introduced in the 1940s by (Hempel, 1945) the paradox of the raven can be
stated as follows: H1 is logically equivalent to H2, and thus both hypotheses
should be equally confirmed (or disconfirmed) by the same observations.
(H1) All ravens are black ⇒ (∀x )(raven(x ) ⊃ black(x ))
(H2) All non-black things are non-ravens ⇒ (∀x )(¬black(x ) ⊃ ¬raven(x ))
However, that leaves us with the un-pleasant conclusion that observing a red
ball, or blue shoes, both of which confirm H2, also confirm that all ravens are
black, which clearly could not be accepted. Again, far from being a paradox, we
argue that the problem lies in our FOPL representation of H1 and H2, namely the
universal use of predication to represent genuine predicates as well as ontological
types. Instead, we argue that both H1 and H2 have one and the representation,
namely (∀x :: raven)(black(x )) - that is, black is true of every object of type
raven, which is equally confirmed and disconfirmed by the same observations
(due to space limitations we cannot here show how in ontologik H1 and H2
would get the same logical form, but interested readers can see (Saba, 2019b)).
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